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 Detachment as a corporate ethic: Materializing CSR in the diamond supply 
chain 
 
Jamie Cross 
 
Abstract: This article examines efforts by De Beers, the world’s largest supplier of 
rough diamonds, to better regulate the conditions under which its stones are cut and 
polished across a global network of buyers, contractors, and subcontractors. Drawing 
on ethnographic fieldwork at an offshore processing unit in South India that was built 
to service De Beers’ buyers, this article explores how ethical accounting regimes are 
materialized on the floor of a global factory and how they are grounded in an 
industrial bureaucracy. In a global supply chain like this one, I argue, codes of 
practice and audit checklists demand to be understood as material technologies that 
afford companies and individuals new purchase on an ethic of detachment. 
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From hard rock to diamond ring 
By the end of the twentieth century the global trade in diamond gemstones—one of 
the world’s most iconic luxury commodities—had become an important focus for 
campaigns by international human- and labor-rights organizations. In 2000 the De 
Beers Group, whose monopolistic business practices saw it control the global supply 
of rough diamonds during the twentieth century, responded to these campaigns with 
two regulatory interventions. The first was the “Kimberly Process Certification 
Scheme,” a UN-backed mechanism intended to certify the origin of all diamond 
 gemstones and curtail the trade in conflict diamonds. The second intervention was the 
“Best Practice Principles” (BPP) program that introduced a new set of voluntary 
regulations into what De Beers calls its “diamond pipeline.” 
Rough diamonds that are dug out of the ground in mines owned by De Beers 
in Africa and North America are sorted, valued, and distributed by a daughter 
company, the Diamond Trading Company (DTC). The DTC sells rough stones to a 
tightly controlled number of buyers, called “Sightholders.” Sightholders either 
process rough stones in their own facilities, or contract rough stones out to specialized 
manufacturers who cut and polish them into consumer-quality diamonds. De Beers’ 
code of practice, developed without the participation of any other industry 
stakeholders, introduced a new set of standards into this complex global web of 
traders and manufacturers.  
When it was launched, the BPP program was heralded as a new commitment 
to self-regulation at all levels of De Beers’ diamond pipeline, “from hard rock to 
diamond ring” as publicity materials put it. Under the program, all cutting and 
polishing facilities fully or partially owned by De Beers and its Sightholders (as well 
as facilities they subcontracted work to) were required to become fully compliant with 
a set of minimum business standards. Their compliance would be guaranteed through 
what De Beers described as a “systematic assurance program” that involved a series 
of documentary procedures and a third-party financial, social, and environmental 
audit. The new initiative, it was announced, would ensure “that the De Beers Family 
of companies, Sightholders and applicable third parties operate to an ethical, legal 
professional, social and environmental standard,” and that the exploration, extraction, 
sorting, cutting, and polishing of diamonds took place in ways that did not “endanger 
the health or welfare of individuals” or the environment. The BPP would, De Beers 
 claimed, “lead to a general improvement in responsible business practices” across the 
diamond industry. 
 
Detachment as a corporate ethic 
 
De Beers’ best-practices program presents anthropology with a classic example of 
“corporate ethicizing” at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Responding to 
civil society concerns, the scope of its corporate responsibility program encompassed 
a complex and diverse global supply chain to include the buyers of its stones and their 
subcontractors. Valorizing the willingness and the capacity of market actors to 
safeguard and guarantee business practices, De Beers deployed what is now a familiar 
array of tools, including a code of practice and a set of performance indicators against 
which a diverse chain of diamond sorting, processing, cutting and polishing facilities 
could be audited, evaluated, and reported. 
There is now an established social scientific critique of corporate social 
responsibility. A growing body of literature shows how CSR advances and entrenches 
neoliberal capitalism by “embedding social relations in economic processes” (Shamir 
2004, 2008), naturalizing the role of market actors as the stewards and arbiters of 
justice (Blowfield and Dolan 2008) and reproducing North-South relationships of 
dependency and subordination (Rajak 2008). In this critique, corporate codes of 
conduct and systems of inspection are agents of abstraction and virtualism (Carrier 
and Miller 1998; Miller 1998; Strathern 2000, 2002). They produce 
“decontextualized” relationships and knowledge, by collapsing the everyday politics 
of work and the complexity of located personal relationships, questions of procedure 
 and norms, outcomes and indicators, and by translating complicated and messy social 
worlds into standardized concepts and categories (Dolan 2008). 
In this article I extend the anthropology of “corporate ethicizing” by 
examining the introduction of De Beers’ BPP program at an offshore diamond 
manufacturing facility in India. Like other articles in this special issue, I explore 
“corporate ethicizing” as a process rooted in the mundane, quotidian work of doing 
business. The offshore manufacturing zone is a unique space of contemporary global 
production, one that is marked by the near total removal of controls and regulations 
on corporate practices. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, I show how ethical 
accounting regimes feed into the ongoing efforts by supply-chain capitalists and 
factory managers within this space to separate themselves legally, morally, and 
socially from binding obligations and responsibility to producers. Codes of conduct 
and social audits are materialized in global supply chains in ways that provide 
executive and manager new purchase on what we might call an “ethic of detachment.” 
 What do I mean by “detachment”? Current trends in economic sociology 
approach the bracketing and ending of relationships between two parties in a 
transaction as crucial acts in the performance of a market, and seek to grasp how the 
terms of this “detachment” are established and coordinated (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 
et al. 2007). Anthropologists have responded to this discussion by arguing that 
“detachment” is a fiction of economics, one that can never really be achieved in real-
world transactions, and emphasize the constant, complex nature of attachments 
linking people in market transactions (Holm 2007; Miller 2002). One route through 
this debate is to see detachment as a relationship, or as relational. There is emerging 
interest among anthropologists in “disconnection, distance, and detachment” as 
meaningful frameworks for action and forms of virtue (Candea et al. 2009). In this 
 light the bracketing, limiting, and ending of economic relationships, like those 
between actors in a market transaction, are always still relationships; and, to the 
extent that detachment is a guide to conduct, it is an ethic.  
One way to think through detachment as a corporate ethic is to see it as the 
antithesis of an ethic of attachment or reconnection like that promulgated by the Fair 
Trade movement. Fair Trade initiatives construct, convey, and manage a set of ethical 
values through the commodity chain, inscribing the relationship between consumer 
and producer with notions of sociality, respect, obligation, long term attachment, and 
the possibility for intimacy (Dolan 2008: 274–80). This ethic of attachment is what 
makes Fair Trade unique, and why ethical accounting regimes are at their most 
prominent and vociferous in the commodity chains for Fair Trade goods. 
The supply chains of many consumer goods in the Euro-American world, 
however, stand in direct contrast. The actions of many corporate entities and 
managerial subjects continue to be guided by the principle that successful, globally 
competitive business demands finite limits on and the possibility of closure from 
relationships with producers. Beyond the rhetoric of corporate social responsibility, 
companies and managers continue to be deeply invested in the creation of short-term, 
nonbinding attachments to producers. They are constantly engaged in establishing 
limits and endpoints to relationships in their supply chain, ensuring that contracts are 
time-bound and spatially defined, resisting proximity and intimacy, and framing 
relationships around difference and distance. 
Capitalist modernity has given rise to diverse spatial formations (Thrift 1996), 
devices (Callon 2007) and disciplines (Rose 1999) that might be said to produce 
“detachment.” These are brought together in a productive synthesis inside the free-
trade zones that have proliferated across the global South. Ostensibly built to 
 encourage foreign investment and promote rapid industrialization, economic zones 
create unique territorial, judicial, and discursive spaces (see, e.g., Cross 2010b; Ong 
2006). Detachment is instantiated in the zone: built into its physical design, its legal 
constitution, the political economy of its investments, and the social architecture of 
relations between manufacturing companies that locate inside them and the people 
they employ. Little surprise perhaps that zones have gained such notoriety as the gray 
areas in global supply chains (Tsing 2009). 
Detachment is different from what Anthony Giddens meant by 
“disembedding” (Giddens 1990). Where dissembedding described a historical 
dynamic of ever-increasing separation between society and the market that was 
symptomatic of capitalist modernity (see also Thrift 1998), detachment describes a 
relationship that has to be constantly made as such. It is in this sense that Nigel Thrift 
describes capitalism as a “practical order that is constantly in motion” (ibid.: 78). 
Detachment as a corporate ethic is one that must be constantly performed in the 
everyday operations of management. In this, I suggest, codes of practice and audit 
technologies emerge as unique material technologies that enable transnational 
corporations and individual managers to establish limits and endpoints in their 
relationships to producers.  
 
Worldwide diamonds 
 
Between 2004 and 2006 there were eighty-four companies on De Beers’ list of 
Sightholders. Twelve of these companies subcontracted the cutting and polishing of 
diamonds sourced from De Beers to an offshore manufacturer based in South India. 
This factory, called Worldwide Diamonds, was located in a nondescript whitewashed 
 building inside a secure and gated offshore manufacturing enclave in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh. Established in 1997, Worldwide Diamonds applied modern 
assembly-line technologies and hyper-efficient work processes to the diamond 
industry. Work here was casual, insecure, low-waged, and labor-intensive, and by 
2005 the factory had undercut all its major competitors to emerge as one of the 
world’s premier low-cost, high-volume producers of small-sized, medium-quality 
diamonds. At its peak it employed 1200 people and processed 14,000 carats of rough 
diamond each month, with an export value of approximately $4 million.  
 Between January and December 2005, I was given open access to the 
Worldwide Diamonds factory as part of a wider research project on industrial life and 
work in India’s new economic zones. My research drew on a tradition of ethnographic 
research in which anthropologists of work “learn by doing.” For twelve months I 
trained as a diamond polisher in the factory’s cornering, blocking, and bruiting 
sections, and carried out repeated and extended interviews with the factory’s 
managers, sitting in on meetings and planning sessions. The gatekeepers who made 
this research possible made no demands on my data and no requests that I conceal the 
factory’s identity. The names of companies that appear in this paper are all real, but 
the names and identities of individuals have all been changed. 
In the second half of the twentieth century diamond manufacturers were 
engaged in a struggle to remain globally competitive, by detaching their cutting and 
polishing operations from forms of state and social regulation. Since the 1970s, 
increased global demand had seen diamond manufacturing shift from long established 
cutting and polishing workshops in Belgium to international locations with cheaper 
labor costs and more relaxed industrial legislation. Gemstone dealers in the Indian 
states of Gujarat and Maharashtra captured a high proportion of this global trade. But 
 in the 1990s India’s new economic zones, which offered a raft of exemptions from tax 
and labor regimes, promised new opportunities for international investors.  
Worldwide Diamonds was the international diamond industry’s first direct 
investment in India’s new offshore economy. The investment was a joint venture 
between Bettonville, a Belgian company that is the world’s largest manufacturer of 
tools and equipment for the diamond industry, and Hennig, a British company that is 
the UK’s largest diamond broker. Their factory was conceived of as an “in-house” 
processing facility that would provide access to India’s low-cost labor market for De 
Beers’ European and North American Sightholders. The social organization of 
production here reproduced historic relationships of power and domination, with a 
labor force comprised of Telugu men and women who were differentiated by caste, 
class, and language from the factory’s Indian managers and its white European 
executives (Cross 2009).  
Because they have been such notorious sites of labor abuse in global supply 
chains, free-trade zones have also emerged as political sites in which companies that 
aspire to be good corporate citizens must seek to limit or manage potential damage to 
their reputations. Economic zones have become increasingly significant as spaces in 
which companies seek to establish, enact or perform themselves as “ethical.” Sure 
enough, in 2004, one of Worldwide Diamonds twelve clients decided that its offshore 
contractor fell within the remit of De Beers’ new ethical accounting regime. 
 
Best practices  
 
At the end of 2004, the Millennium Group’s chief financial officer travelled to 
London, and Worldwide Diamonds’ senior managers travelled to Mumbai, for 
 training workshops on the BPP program run by the Diamond Trading Company. The 
framework for implementing De Beers’ BPP program created a spatial-temporal map 
of responsibility across a global network of traders and suppliers. The need for 
“action” was determined on the basis of an agent’s proximity to or distance from De 
Beers. Companies in which De Beers or its Sightholders held a stake had to 
demonstrate their compliance with the BPPs within two years, while facilities like 
Worldwide Diamonds’ that had written or oral contracts with De Beers’ Sightholders 
were required to become compliant by June 2005.  
Becoming compliant was a two-stage process. First, a manufacturer had to 
commission an independent on-site audit by the Société Générale de Surveillance 
(SGS), a Geneva-based company that offers third-party inspection, testing, 
certification, and verification services to a wide range of major corporate clients, and 
which was the certified auditor for the BPP process. This audit would take place once. 
Secondly, a manufacturer had to complete a self-assessment process and provide 
written evidence that the factory recognized De Beers’ practices and principles. This 
self-assessment was to be submitted for independent monitoring, verification, and 
peer review and was due to be repeated on an annual basis. 
Worldwide Diamonds’ senior executives returned to their factory largely 
unfazed by the implications of its new accounting regime. As they saw it, 
transnational corporations like De Beers had to perform a delicate balancing act. On 
one hand they had to make the kind of regulatory performance demanded of a good 
corporate citizen. On the other, they had to reaffirm their commitment to market 
freedoms as demanded by their own Sightholders. From their perspective, the BPP 
was a device that allowed the industry’s dominant actor to limit its future exposure to 
negative publicity, while ensuring that business practices in the supply chain 
 remained “competitive.” Adam, the Millennium Group’s chief financial officer, 
described the rationale to me: 
 
Adam: “For De Beers it is essential to safeguard the industry. If there are any 
accusations about the diamond industry in the future … Any accusations that the 
industry is doing something bad.… Well now, before any negative publicity has a 
chance to come out De Beers can say: ‘We have our codes of conduct. We are strictly 
implementing them. If someone is found to have done something wrong, we will take 
action against them. You can’t blame the diamond industry....’” 
 
At the same time, he explained, regulatory interventions had to be bracketed, confined 
to specific areas of business. Ambiguity was essential: 
 
Adam: “Their code has to be ambiguous. It cannot control all aspects of business 
behavior. There are some things it can check, like whether or not we are employing 
child labor, if we have fire exits or if we provide drinking water. But the moment they 
try to control the business environment … the moment that they try to put restrictions 
on salary structures or on incentive systems, well … See: there is a line and De Beers 
have to ensure that they don’t cross it to interfere with the business environment.” 
 
The Millennium Group hired a Hong Kong-based consultancy firm, “Best Practice 
Consultants,” to guide them through the BPP program. Two Israeli entrepreneurs had 
established the consultancy firm specifically for this purpose. “Without the right 
navigation,” the company’s sales brochure states,  
 
 “the journey towards compliance with the Best Practice Principles can be frustrating 
and time-consuming.… Dealing with all aspects of BPP compliance is a complex 
process that requires specialized knowledge. Our rich knowledge of all current BPP 
legislation and procedures ensures that our clients take the fastest and most cost-
effective track towards complying with BPP requirements.…” 
 
At the end of 2004 these two consultants travelled to Hyderabad, the state 
capital of Andhra Pradesh, and ran a workshop for Worldwide Diamonds’ managers. 
The participants included two senior European executives and twelve young Indian 
management trainees, to whom the task of actually bringing Worldwide Diamonds 
into line with the BPP program was delegated. 
 
Walking the line 
 
Worldwide Diamonds’ management trainees were aged between 22 and 26, and had 
graduate master’s degrees in engineering or management from provincial English 
medium colleges in South India. With salaries of 8000 rupees (approximately USD 
200) a month, their earnings were more than double that of the factory’s production 
workers, but still represented the bottom of India’s white-collar graduate labor 
market. These young managers all dreamt of moving upwards into the higher ranks of 
business professionals, or of travelling overseas to pursue further educational 
qualifications.  
As they saw it, the biggest everyday challenge of modern factory management 
was to avoid becoming embroiled in a web of close, binding, personal relationships 
with the people they were employed to manage and control. They clamored away 
 from relationships with the factory’s workforce, afraid that any intimation of 
closeness, friendship, or intimacy with individuals might offer them some kind of 
leverage in requests for a promotion, a wage increase, extra leave, extra overtime, or a 
reduction in workload. Managers like Vikram, Jeet, and Chiru put these problems 
succinctly during interviews with me on and off the factory floor. Their anxieties 
stand testament to the difficulties of imposing a high-intensity production regime on 
people with whom you enjoy close relations, and to the constant work or effort 
involved in successfully achieving a degree of “distance” from workers. Detachment 
was seen as a precondition for the rational, market-oriented calculations and impartial 
decisions required of a modern professional, essential for achieving control and 
productivity. Achieving detachment meant purging oneself of sentiment, foreclosing 
any affective ties of obligation or reciprocity. 
 
Vikram: “Relations with workers can’t be avoided. They’re necessary, they’re a must. 
Without them you can’t get the required outputs on the shop floor. But at the same 
time you can’t try to build good relations with workers here. You’ll never be 
successful like that. If you want them to meet targets and to keep the quality up then 
you have to be strict, you have to be disciplined. You can’t go with your sentiments. 
You can’t get production with sentiments.” 
 
Understanding, finding, and maintaining this fine line was a preeminent day-to-day 
concern and was a repeated motif in my conversational interviews. 
 
Jeet: “You can’t be friends or enemies with the workers here.… There will be some 
situations when I have to compel workers to do certain things. And if I am 
 maintaining a friendship with them I just won’t be able to do that. But you also just 
can’t get things done by being authoritative! I’m talking about being on the shop floor 
where you spend eight hours a day. When you’re there you have to get personal with 
workers so that you can create a good atmosphere for work. But there are always 
some limitations. Because when there is a managerial gap between you and them—
and there should be a gap—you must not show it. You should not show the gap 
physically or allow others to feel it. But you have to maintain it. You have to maintain 
it for yourselves. How to maintain the line, though … well that varies from time to 
time … I can’t draw the line straight away. If I immediately and stubbornly draw a 
line then it’s sure that I’ll lose the workers, and I don’t want to lose them. These are 
the things that show our competencies.” 
 
Reciprocal social ties are sometimes described in Telugu as tapana: actions that 
provoke a sense of compulsion in the recipient to do something in return. The 
accounts of young managers describe a keen aversion to tapana relations with 
workers, and to the obligations and responsibilities they bring. Chiru explained how 
these bonds worked in the context of his family. 
 
Chiru: “Say I am at my house, with my two brothers. If I help my brother in one 
situation, he will help in another. If I do something for him then he will think to do 
something for me too. He will get some sense that he should help me. He will be 
feeling tapana. And some delay will be there. And that delay is useful. If I support 
someone at one time, later they will feel that they can come to me.” 
 
 In the context of a manufacturing unit in which there was pressure to increase the 
quantity and quality of production, tapana relations and their expectations of delayed 
reciprocity were precisely what managers like Chiru sought to avoid. 
 
Chiru: “I have not been touching the personal aspects up til now. No. I’ve just been 
going to a superficial level. If we go into the deep personal aspects it means touching 
a deep sensitive part of them. Am I right? If you go twenty to thirty percent deep into 
personal aspects it won’t affect them much. If I go deep it increases my responsibility 
also. I feel there would be some responsibility on my shoulders ...”  
 
Such strategies of avoidance were tightly bound up with the creation and performance 
of a professional managerial self, a stable normative identity that was frequently 
associated with the figure of the engineer. 
 
Vikram: “When I came here, I learned from the workers. I used to be friendly with 
them so that I could manage problems that came up. But I maintained those relations 
in a smooth and cool manner. I behaved as an engineer.” 
 
So while managers observed and profiled workers, they resisted any efforts by 
workers to collect information about them. They worked to maintain a distance from 
workers. 
 
Jeet: “The workers should not know me. I should only know them. They should not 
be able to guess me, because they can use that. But I should be able to guess them. I 
should be able to know their strong points and their weak points. From the first, I 
 didn’t bring personal relations into the job. According to me, the job is entirely 
different and personal is entirely different. Managers are not interested in personal 
matters. So I won’t allow people to ask me about myself. That is my way of living 
style. My father used to say ‘don’t bring personals into job profile’ because if you 
bring any one of the personal reasons into the job people will start to ask you: ‘Sir 
will you help me in this manner or that manner.’” 
 
It was against the backdrop of these managerial struggles to establish and maintain 
limits and boundaries on relationships with workers that De Beers’ BPP program was 
introduced to Worldwide Diamonds. For the factory’s management trainees, this was 
to be their first exposure to the language of CSR, to codes of conduct and social 
audits. What is today an important feature of graduate education at business schools 
in Europe and North America has yet to enter the curricula of provincial colleges in 
South India. As I will show, their efforts to bring the factory into compliance with De 
Beers’ BPP program become inseparable from their efforts to become management 
professionals. The specific form in which the program was materialized on the factory 
floor presented new tools with which to further their detachment from workplace 
relationships.  
 
Materializing CSR 
 
At their workshop in Hyderabad, Worldwide Diamonds’ management trainees were 
presented with a large, glossy lever-arch folder. Inside were three documents: 1) a 
“BPP Requirements Book,” an annotated bibliography of the international laws, 
covenants, regulations, and agreements that were used as the basis for the BPP’s 
 performance indicators; 2) a BPP manual, which provided a detailed description of 
the program, including a timetable for its implementation; and 3) a workbook, a series 
of tables with the specific BPP performance indicators against which a company’s 
compliance would be audited. The folder was carried back into the factory, where it 
was dumped on a shelf in a rickety steel cabinet in a corner of the laser cutting room. 
It was the sheer physicality of the BPP program and the written tasks that these 
documents created that presented managers with their most immediate problems. 
“This thing is really a big headache,” said Vikram. “Don’t get me wrong. But I just 
don’t like very clumsy, very bureaucratic things. I had so many other things to do and 
now, on top of everything, I’ve got that huge, great clunky folder and all that paper.” 
 Like all ethical accounting regimes, De Beers’ BPP program is primarily 
constituted not as a process or a practice but as a material object: a set of written 
documents. Since 2004 these documents have been distributed, downloaded, and 
emailed along De Beers’ diamond pipeline, gradually finding their way to contractors.  
Documents are central to the performance of corporate social responsibility. 
Yet the material significance of documents and the work involved in their production, 
circulation, and dissemination has been overlooked by recent anthropology. As the 
work of Annelise Riles (1998, 2006a, 2006b) reminds us, the document is the 
“paradigmatic material artefact of modern knowledge practices,” the artifact that 
materializes them all. Ethical accounting regimes hinge on the performance and 
enactment of proper bureaucratic rituals, procedures, and practices, all of which 
require an engagement with the document as a material technology. Indeed codes of 
practice and auditing, monitoring, and verification mechanisms can all be described as 
“calls to documentation” (Riles 2006a: 6). De Beers’ BPP program is a case in point. 
 The successful implementation of the program required documents to beget more 
documents.  
In 2005, each facility being submitted for auditing and verification under De 
Beers’ new ethical accounting regime was required to complete an audit workbook 
and write separate, substantive replies to each question. In addition, they were 
required to maintain an up-to-date series of policy statements. These documents were 
collated and uploaded via an electronic submission system to a central database run 
by the BPP team. The BPP database sent out an automatic email notification that the 
documents had been received, and sent an email alerting De Beers’ external auditor, 
SGS, that they were ready for inspection. At one of SGS’s regional offices in India, 
the documents would be downloaded and proofread: checked for any missing answers 
or missing policies. The documents would then be passed on to SGS’s head office in 
Geneva, where they were “monitored for global consistency.” Any infringements, 
what are called major or minor breaches of the BPP, would be made visible in the 
database. A factory that was in breach of the code was notified in writing, and its 
response was made in the same way.  
The problem facing anthropologists is how, as Annelise Riles puts it (1998), to 
bring into view the creative work involved in this work of documentation, and in the 
production of “convincing, effective documents”—that is, to reveal the material 
significance of documents rather than just their discursive power. Attention to the 
materiality of CSR and the work of creating or using documents is a different point of 
entry into current debates than that taken by anthropologists writing in the 
Foucauldian tradition. In this tradition, the key instruments used to implement an 
ethical accounting regime (like the codes of practice and the audit checklist) are 
discursive technologies that encode different levels, genres, and expressions of 
 governmentality. The focus here is on the “hidden politics of meaning” contained 
within a burgeoning library of international codes, protocols, guidelines, and 
standards, and their power as “instruments of political or ideological control” that 
produce selves, persons, and society (Riles 1998, 2006). In this vein, accounting tools 
can appear to install, as Dolan evocatively puts it, “new metrics of governance” 
(Dolan 2010: 34).  
A document like De Beers’ BPP Workbook is particularly conducive to this 
kind of analysis. The workbook was effectively a checklist that translated the key 
clauses of internationally recognized protocols into a series of standardized and 
verifiable questions about financial and business procedures, employment and 
working conditions (including health and safety), and environmental practices. 
Among those on “employment,” for example, was question number 23: “Are all 
workers aware of and clearly understand the terms and conditions of their 
employment including working hours, wage structure and standing orders?” And 
under “health and safety” was question number 30: “Are all workers advised of their 
duties, responsibilities and rights with regard to health and safety and are they made 
aware of the entity’s health and safety procedures?” By erasing the ways that power 
and political economy are transcribed on the working body, such questions and 
categories made individual workers the sole bearers of responsibility for health and 
well-being. Like other attempts to codify health and safety risks in the modern 
industrial workplace, they removed from consideration all other factors that affected 
the individual’s well-being at work, and they produced the worker as an autonomous 
and flexible laboring subject (Cross 2010a; Martin 1994). 
Yet in this Foucauldian tradition of analysis, as Riles argues (2006a), texts and 
categories can come to exert an unduly hegemonic and overdetermining influence. 
 Documents, she writes, both “anticipate and enable certain actions,” “they are both 
open and closed.” While this BPP Workbook may demand certain kinds of responses 
form Worldwide Diamonds’ managers, it could not complete itself, and the work of 
completing it, of producing appropriate documentary responses, was also a pathway 
for action. To think about codes and checklists as material artifacts is to ask how they 
are being used, and what actors may be doing with them (ibid.: 10–12). As I will 
show, the power of De Beers’ BPP program was not simply that it crafted new 
managerial subjects, but rather that it offered people new purchase in their ongoing 
struggles to extricate themselves from ties and obligations. 
 
Technologies of detachment 
 
Vikram, Jeet, and Chiru threw themselves into the task of completing the BPP 
documents with considerable zeal. They organized meetings with each other to 
discuss the precise wording of the workbook questions, and they drafted multiple 
replies. As they formulated these responses, Vikram, Jeet, and Chiru turned to the 
original texts, borrowing sentences, phrases, and categories for quotation and 
repetition. The BPP documents were a vital resource and appear to have been 
designed precisely for this purpose. The BPP Manual, for example, gives detailed 
instructions on what company policies should look like, even offering generic 
sentences or statements that can be cut and pasted into a company’s written responses. 
A section on employment, for example, states that: “Key elements in a policy on 
freedom of association and collective bargaining might include: a statement that 
worker representatives must have access to their members in the workplace, and that 
the employer does not interfere with the activities of worker organizations.” Making 
 Worldwide Diamonds’ documents convincing was, as Riles argues (1998: 386), “less 
about transparent meaning than about the aesthetics of logic and language,” and 
Vikram, Jeet, and Chiru’s job was to make the documents look right.  
In their own accounts, the practical task of implementing De Beers’ new 
accounting regime begins to emerge as a creative rather than a subjectifying task: a 
task through which they could perform themselves as modern professionals and 
derive a reflexive satisfaction. 
 
Jeet: “I’ve learnt a lot from working in this factory, especially the qualities of a 
professional leader, a manager. He should be smart, professional, very formal. He 
should know the rules and regulations systems, like ISO and BPP. All of it.” 
 
Vikram: “Some factories are like football. They’re rough, they don’t have many rules, 
you push and you shove. But our company is like cricket, it’s full of rules and 
regulations. And being here, you have to come to how to play the game. You have to 
know how to handle the rules, how to deal with the paperwork, and like that you 
move from being amateur to going pro.”  
 
As they reflected on what they had learned over the first year of their management 
training, their understanding of how to organize, manage, and control the factory’s 
labor force was inextricably bound up with the bureaucratic systems and procedures 
associated with the BPP program. The task of creating effective BPP documents 
seemed to have helped them legitimize or formalize the fine line between what they 
called the personal and the professional, and extricate themselves from binding ties or 
 obligations to workers. As Jeet told me after the BPP documents had been submitted 
in 2005:  
 
Jeet: “These systematic procedures are necessary if we want to make this company 
professional. What is written has to be done.” 
 
Similarly, Vikram described the BPP documents as “step by step guides, so there 
would be no confusion about what to do.” Chiru put the efficacy of the documents 
most bluntly: 
 
Chiru: “No one can complain now. What we do here, what happens here is the 
company’s will. The will of the company. Not of any one person.”  
 
As they filled out the audit workbook and finalized their written responses, the work 
of documentation permeated their everyday interactions on the factory floor. 
Confronted with small requests for personal favors or special treatment by workers, 
they used the documents to justify or explain a refusal to enter into what they 
understood as close or personal relationships.  
 
Chiru: “I’ve learnt a different management style in this factory.… Now I know the 
predetermined parameters that you should keep in mind. I learnt how a professional 
manager should go.… There is no partiality in him. That’s the philosophy that a 
professional manager should follow. People should not create disparity by liking one 
person more than another. The rule for one is the rule for all.”  
 
 Vikram: “A professional manager should not spend time listening to the words of 
workers. A professional person is never sentimental. They’re experts. If they are to be 
professional then they have to think about quality and production, and not get 
distracted by conditions and salaries. If we have all these systems in place, we don’t 
have to get distracted by workers complaining to us that the conditions are not good, 
that the toilet facilities are bad, that the production is too heavy, that the seats are 
uncomfortable, that the dust is there, that the salaries are not good.”  
 
The same effect was visible higher up the management hierarchy. Worldwide 
Diamonds’ senior management executives used the code to define and delineate what 
was meant by terms and conditions of work, bracketing or separating from them the 
actual costs of labor. “I think we mostly comply with the BPP,” Adam concluded, 
after the company had submitted the audit workbook.  
 
Adam: “There are a few problems with fire escapes and things like that here but codes 
like this are basically for diamond workshops where there are really bad working 
conditions, like those on the other side of India, in Surat and Mumbai. The real 
problem is with sweatshops. Not factories like this where people work in 
humanitarian conditions.”  
 
The power of audit documents in a low-waged, hyper-efficient manufacturing unit 
comes in the combination of their discursive and material qualities. Inside Worldwide 
Diamonds, De Beers’ code of conduct and audit workbook were never just 
ideologically loaded texts that abstracted and decontexualized relationships between 
transnational capital, managerial subjects, and a global labor force. Instead it was 
 precisely the discursive power of these texts—the power to abstract and 
decontextualize, to extract relationships from local contexts of interaction, to codify 
and standardize relationships—that resonated most with managers. The work of 
filling out and completing the documentation opened up new paths of action that 
extended, deepened, and entrenched an ethic of “detachment.” They delineated 
specific terms to the relationships between employer and employee, manager and 
worker. They limited these relationships both temporally (to the period of the working 
day) and spatially (to the borders of the workplace). And they ensured that any 
commitments or obligations that might have arisen out of everyday relationships with 
workers were “encompassed” by global institutions and accountability regimes that 
aggregated moral authority (Strathern 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since 2005 and my original fieldwork for this paper, the scope of De Beers’ BPP 
program has been significantly adjusted, as a result of what industry insiders call 
“pushback” from Sightholders. Confronted with the implications and costs of 
monitoring their diverse trading, mining, and manufacturing facilities, Sightholders 
have lobbied De Beers to limit the scope of the BPP program. Some time between 
2007 and 2008, a significant clause was introduced into the small print. Today only a 
Sightholder’s “significant contractors” - —those to whom it provides seventy-five 
percent or more of their annual turnover—are required to comply with the terms of 
De Beers’ BPP program. A major diamond manufacturing company like Worldwide 
Diamonds that offers services to a number of Sightholders—none of whom 
individually accounted for seventy-five percent or more of its business—is no longer 
 required to submit itself for inspection. Indeed, after the events described in this 
article, Worldwide Diamonds ended its participation in the BPP program.  
Empirical accounts of corporate social responsibility at sites of offshore 
manufacturing have often chosen to emphasize the deliberate efforts of corporations 
or factory managers to subvert or bend an inspection process. In such cases “an 
imperative for transparency and accountability can produce instead opacity and 
deception” (Dolan 2008: 287). In this article I have taken a different tack, showing 
how codes of conduct and social audits can segue perfectly into the efforts of 
companies and managers to organize complex global supply chains, and of offshore 
manufacturers to organize cost-efficient and competitive systems of mass production. 
My argument rests on a paradox, that ethical accounting regimes which are premised 
on the creation of closer ties, attachments, or relationships between global 
corporations and producers actually allow companies and managers new tools with 
which to delineate the ends and limits to these relationships, fostering what I have 
called an ethic of detachment. 
The real success of corporate social responsibility in a global supply chain is 
that it redistributes responsibility and obligation across a network of actors, rather 
than concentrating and focusing it upon one (Crook 2000; Strathern 1996). This 
would appear to hold true both for large corporate entities as well as for individuals. 
In the diamond industry, De Beers’ attempt to manage its relationships with 
Sightholders and subcontractors through a corporate social responsibility program is 
folded into managerial relationships with labor. The BPP program enabled De Beers 
to distribute responsibilities through a global network of Sightholders and 
subcontractors, allowing particular kinds of risks to be isolated and quarantined 
before they can spread. Meanwhile, on the factory floor of a global subcontracting 
 company, De Beers’ BPP initiative presents managerial subjects with new tools to 
bracket themselves from personal obligations and ties to workers. The language of 
CSR and the array of auditing, monitoring, and verification tools present transnational 
corporations and managerial subjects alike with new ways to manage, define, control, 
and limit their attachments to producers.  
Much current anthropology has chosen to follow the kinds of attachments that 
are being created by discourses of corporate social responsibility. Yet much strategic 
and personal decision-making in today’s global supply chains appears to be 
underpinned by an ethic of detachment. If anthropology is to examine how ethical 
accounting regimes are grounded in the everyday work of doing business, then 
perhaps we need to think about the material technologies that facilitate this work. 
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